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Abstracts Fraisopi, Fausto: Einleitung. Radikalität,Häresien und Horizonterweiterungen des phänomenologischen Denkens Barroso, Gabriel Lago: Die Spaltung von Sein und Welt. Zu Heideggers Begriff der Metaphysik This paper attempts to clarify Heideggers concept of metaphysics as it is developed in the period immediately after the publication of Being and Time. According to Heidegger, the concept of metaphysics contains two different tasks: the question of Being as such (Sein als solches) and the question of being asa whole (Seiende im Ganzen). These two tasks correspond to Fundamental Ontology and Metontology. Based on this distinction, I argue that the concept of metaphysics introduces a fundamental change in the philosophical project of Being and Time. Firstly, I show in what sense Fundamental Ontology can be understood as an immanent critique of Phenomenology, which attempts to overcome an omission in its account of the transcendental field. Secondly, I argue that Metontology should not be taken as an attempt to develop regional ontologies lacking in Being and Time, but as a new philosophical task concerning the world as being as a whole. However, this task cannot be considered on the basis of the concept of world presented in Being and Time. Metontology is concerned with a new account of the phenomenon of nature and of Heideggers concept of facticity, which goes beyond the boundaries of the Analytic of Dasein. Stanciu, Ovidiu: La radicalisation de la phénoménologie chez Eugen Fink. My paper aims to lay out the main tenets of the philosophical project Eugen Fink unfolded in his post-war writings and argues that his enterprise is situated at the crossroads between two compatible yet distinct lines of inquiry: a phenomenology of mediality and a philosophical cosmology. The twofold orientation followed byFinks radicalization of classical phenomenology can best be grasped if we pay heed to the double critical strategy he put in place in order to overcome what he deemed to be the shortcomings of Husserls phenomenology. In the first place, Fink undertakes a »phenomenological critique of Husserl, showing that the paradigmatic models underlying Husserls analysis and, most notably, the preeminence granted to the »individuated thing, drastically limit the field available for a phenomenological description. On this account, Finks critique aims at expanding the domain phenomenology can explore. However, in the second place, Fink points to the limits inherent to phenomenology as such, and advocates for the necessity of supplementing phenomenologys descriptive analysis with a speculative approach. In this sense, his project of radicalizing phenomenology is tantamount to unveiling the speculative presuppositions undergirding and orienting any descriptive inquiry. Novotný, Karel: Welt und Erscheinen bei Jan Patocka. Nähe und Distanz zu Edmund Husserl und Eugen Fink The influence of Eugen Fink on Jan Patocka is undeniable. Fink was his first advisor in questions concerning the phenomenology of the late Husserl in the mid-1930s. But as one can see in the correspondence between Patocka and Fink, there are also some hints to divergences, which this paper tries to make explicit, mainly on the basis of some later works and manuscripts by Patocka. They concern the status of the whole of the world (Weltganzes) as being different from the human lifeworld (Menschenwelt) and the double concept of appearing in the cosmology of Fink, which Patocka - in the early 1970s - confronts with a project of an »asubjective phenomenology. This project, introduced by an unambiguous criticism of the Cartesianism in Husserl, still maintains a certain proximity to Husserl, defining itself as a formal transcendentalism of appearing as such that is not divided into two modes of appearing as in Fink. It can be read as Patockas radicalization of the originary Husserlian project of phenomenology, rather than as its cosmological abandonment in an accordance with Fink. Schuppert, Benjamin: Der Zwischenraum des Erscheinens und die doppelte Lektüre. Zu différance und Phänomenalität in Derridas Die Stimme und das Phänomen This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and deconstruction in Jacques Derridas Voice and Phenomenon. I argue that the in-between status of deconstructive readings becomes visible only if we understand the double movement of reading, which neither refutes phenomenology nor simply carries on its program. As I show, the necessity of a »double reading can be grasped only in terms of the figure of diff.rance, which escapes the opposition between appearing and disappearing. Since there is no linear transition from the field of phenomenality to diff.rance, deconstruction can only articulate itself as a transgression of the text, a transgression contained in the text itself which at the same time points to its irreducible duplicity. Serban, Claudia: Les expériences de limpossible. Radicalisations de la phénoménologie chez Michel Henry et Jean-Luc Marion If a certain primacy of possibility (existential possibility or egological potentiality) can be acknowledged in both Husserl and Heidegger, the French reception of phenomenology deploys one of its important means of accomplishing its radicalization gesture by putting forward the experiences of the impossible, as the case of Michel Henry and of Jean-Luc Marion shows. Michel Henry elaborates a radicalized phenomenology, which deals with the radical immanence of life, whose passivity and finitude reveal an impossibility that only an infinite, absolute Life can overcome. For Jean-Luc Marion, the givenness of the phenomenon discloses its extreme possibility, that of its saturation, which makes its subjective constitution impossible and paves the way for the phenomenological possibility of divine revelation. Our inquiry attempts to show that both these endeavours can be ultimately regarded as radicalizations of the finitude of the living (or human) being. Flock, Philip: Jenseits der Ontotheologie?. Über verschiedene Unendlichkeitsbegriffe in der Architektonik phänomenologischer Metaphysik Is phenomenology a metaphysics of its own type? This is the question that L,szl0 Tengelyi interprets affirmatively in his last oeuvre. Such a type can be characterized as a metaphysics of transgressiveness in contrast to the metaphysics of potentiality. According to Tengelyi, phenomenology must therefore be thought of in the form of a diacritique of world and infinity, which can be seen as the metaphysical architectonics of the transfinite. By relating the difference between thing and world to the difference between transfinite and absolute infinite, it is to be proven that the actual infinite belongs to the reality of the world, precisely in the sense of phenomenology. We want to critically appreciate this attempt of radicalization by confronting it with another radicalization approach: Marc Richirs phenomenology. This will show that in the starting point of the thing-world difference a subtle subjectivism or quasi-Cartesianism is inherent, which does not do justice to the infinity of the world, one which even includes the radical sense of uninhabitability. Müller, Oliver: Postphänomenologie. Über eine technikphilosophische Methode Inmycontribution, I aim at introducing postphenomenology to the Germandebate. Postphenomenology is a philosophical approach developed by the U.S.-American philosopher Don Ihde, and currently intensively discussed and further developed within a lively international community. I will pay special attention to Don Ihdes adaptation of classical phenomenology. Ihde himself draws on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, transforming their phenomenology into a modified hybrid phenomenology that primarily focuses on the technical mediation of our self- and world-relation. Against this background, I describe four basic assumptions of the postphenomenological methodology (such as the...

Mit Texten von Fausto Fraisopi, Gabriel Lago Barroso, Ovidiu Stanciu, Karel Novotný, Raoul Moati, Benjamin Schuppert, Claudia Serban, Fabian Erhardt u.v.a.